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ABSTRACT 
 
Youth Unemployment in Korea: 
From a German and Transitional Labour Market Point of View1 
 
By conventional statistics, youth unemployment seems to be quite moderate in Korea: ‘only’ 
9.6 percent of the ‘active’ youth labour force was unemployed compared to 21.4 percent in 
EU-27 in 2011. Germany, with a youth unemployment rate of 8.5 percent, is one of the very 
few European countries outperforming Korea. But the Korean case is in one respect unusual. 
From the perspective of intergenerational risk sharing Korea’s youth unemployment rate is 
4.6 times higher than the unemployment rate of adults aged 45 to 54; in Germany, this figure 
is only 1.7. Further peculiarities come up if unemployment is measured by the number of 
youth not in employment, education or training (NEET) in percent of the total youth 
population. Korea’s NEET figures are at the top in OECD countries, especially for youth with 
tertiary education. This paper throws some light to explain this conundrum: It sketches, first, 
the main causes of youth unemployment and the general policy interventions; because a 
large part of the problem is structural, possible immediate measures to avoid long-term scar 
effects for the unemployed youth are briefly reviewed; differences between Europe and the 
United States show in particular the importance of automatic stabilizers like unemployment 
insurance in order to reduce the pressure on unfavourable risk sharing for youth in times of 
recession. The main part is devoted to possible lessons for Korea from Europe, in particular 
from Germany. Dual education and vocational training systems that emphasise middle level 
and market oriented skills are identified as institutional device both for fairer intergenerational 
risk sharing as well as for a smoother transition from school to work. In its outlook, the paper 
comes back to the puzzle of highly and academically inflated youth unemployment by 
referring to a possible hidden cause in Korea: A strong insurance motive might explain the 
overall striving for an academic degree inducing not only wasteful congestion at labour 
market entries but also unfair job allocation through credentialism. 
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1 This essay results from the contribution to a debate on youth unemployment during the Asian 
Leadership Conference 2013 in Seoul, March 26-27. I thank Jutta Höhne for assistance in preparing 
the figures, and Christian Brzinsky-Fay, Christian Ebner, Silke Gülker, and Weon-Ho Jeong for 
comments on previous versions. 
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Youth Unemployment in Korea: 
From a German and Transitional Labour Market Point of View 
Günther Schmid 
Introduction 
According to OECD figures, youth unemployment seems to be quite moderate in Korea: 
Compared to the United States and in particular to Europe, youth unemployment – 
conventionally measured as a percentage of the corresponding ‘active’ labour force – was 
only 9.6 percent in 2011 compared to 21.4 percent in all European Member States (EU-
27) and 17.3 percent in the USA. Germany, with an unemployment rate of 8.5 percent, is 
one of the very few European countries outperforming Korea in this respect (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Unemployed youth as % of ‘active’ labour force, age 15–24, 2011 
 
Source: OECD stats, own presentation 
The Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland are the other countries which have relatively 
low levels of youth unemployment. On the other hand, there are EU member states with 
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incredibly high levels of youth unemployment, lifting the overall average level in Europe: 
In 2011, Greece and Spain had levels of around 45 percent, and Portugal, Italy and Ireland 
had levels around 30 percent (Figure 1A, Appendix). More recently, these figures have 
even worsened. The German case, however, was not always so exceptional particularly if 
we look back prior to the recession (Figure 2A, Appendix): Its current ‘comfortable’ level 
of youth unemployment obviously reflects the recent ‘German job miracle’ to a large 
extent (Biavaschi et al. 2012, Eichhorst 2012, Rinne and Zimmermann 2013), whereas the 
US case seems to be largely the consequence of its drastic labour market deterioration 
during the last recession, hitting young people in particular (Bell and Blanchflower 2011). 
However, even in terms of conventional measures, the Korean case is in one respect 
unusual. From the perspective of intergenerational risk sharing Korea’s youth 
unemployment rate is 4.6 times higher than the unemployment rate of adults aged 45 to 
54; in the US this figure is 2.5, in Germany 1.7 (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Intergenerational risk sharing: Youth unemployment compared to the 
unemployment of core age group 45 to 54 
   
Source: OECD stats, own calculation and presentation 
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This is the first puzzle to be resolved. However, there is another conundrum. The 
conventional measure of youth unemployment has serious flaws leading to a lot of 
confusion: it does not consider that many young people become discouraged and withdraw 
from the ‘active’ labor force.2 Youth unemployment measured in NEET takes a broader 
spectrum of jobless people into account: Youth not in employment, education or training 
as a percentage of the total youth population is much higher in Korea (Figure 3): 19 
percent for the age group 15 to 29.  
Figure 3: Youth unemployment measure according to conventional statistics (measured 
as a percentage of ‘active’ labour force, left panel), and according to NEET 
(youth not in employment, education or training as a percentage of the total 
youth population, right panel) 
 
The figures for NEET are not strictly comparable due to different times (USA/Korea 2009) and age groups 
(USA/Korea 15–29). Sources: NEET for USA OECD Economic Surveys Korea 2012, from Figure 10, p. 24; 
for EU/ and Germany: Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2012 
                                                 
2
 The European media, for instance, often report that about half of Greek or Spanish youth (about 50% or 
one of two) are unemployed. This is correct related to the baseline of the active “labour force” (the 
employed and the unemployed); but it is wrong measured in relation to the whole youth population. In 2011, 
youth unemployment as a percentage of the population aged 15–24 was “only” 19% in Spain (one of five), 
and “only” 13% in Greece (European Commission 2012: 412-3). See also Figure 3A in Appendix which 
displays youth unemployment rates by the youth population concept in a time series for US, EU-21, 
Germany and Korea, showing the US in a less favourable light than EU-21, and Korea in a more favourable 
light related to the US, EU-2,1 and even to Germany.    
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Whereas the US figures do not much differ, the German NEET figure for youth aged 15–
24 is even lower. For the age group 15 to 29, however, in Germany the figure is higher 
(11.6 %) though still lower than in Korea.  
For youth with an academic education the Korean figure is even worse. In 2011, 72.5 
percent of high school graduates advanced to tertiary education, but in recent years only 
about half of university graduates have found regular jobs. Consequently, 25 percent of 
tertiary graduates under the age of 30 in 2009 were inactive, engaged neither in 
employment, nor in education, double the OECD average. Comparing the level of 
educational status, the German NEET rate for youth aged 15 to 29 is ‘only’ about 7.5 
percent (OECD 2012: 24). 
So, Korea has a serious youth unemployment problem, and this problem seems to be 
particularly related to those youth with tertiary education, whereas Germany, too, 
obviously has a youth unemployment problem which, however, is mainly related to low 
educational status.  
In the following, I will throw some light on the following questions: First, what are the 
main causes of youth unemployment, and which policy interventions in general could 
contribute to solving the problem? Second, what kind of policy measures could be 
immediately taken to avoid long-term scar effects for unemployed youth? Third, what are 
the main differences between European and the United States-related policy interventions 
against youth unemployment? Fourth, what lessons (and which not) might Korea learn 
from Europe, in particular from Germany? In the outlook I come back to the puzzle of 
highly and academically inflated youth unemployment in Korea by referring to a possible 
hidden cause: A strong insurance motive might explain the overall striving for an 
academic degree. 
1. Main causes of youth unemployment and possible policy interventions 
Youth unemployment has three main causes, and all three may be interconnected: (1) 
Lack of jobs due to economic slumps and loss of international competitiveness; (2) 
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mismatch between skills demanded by existing jobs and skills provided by the educational 
system; (3) labour market rigidities due to inflexible wages, employment protection, high 
non-wage costs due to a generous welfare state or even discrimination. In the following, 
however, I will only briefly sketch the main points based on a quite selective review of the 
literature; the discussion of corresponding policy interventions also only touches on the 
main strategic lines without going into a deeper debate. 
1.1 Youth needs more jobs  
There is no need to prove that youth are the most vulnerable group in economic slumps 
when demand collapses: They are the first to be dismissed, and companies close their 
doors on new recruitments first for the young without work experience (e.g. Kawaguchi 
and Murao 2012). Furthermore, the last recession was particular in one respect: Those 
European countries that experienced the largest increase in youth unemployment3 also had 
sharp declines in house prices during the Great Recession, suggesting a direct link to the 
youth labour market because a disproportionate number of the young work in 
construction, which has suffered particularly from the effects of property price bubbles 
(Bell and Blanchflower 2011). 
The first thing, therefore, that governments can do is to help mitigate economic slumps 
through deficit spending in the slump and by savings in the boom. Such Keynesian 
instruments have some value but are limited due to policy failure: Politicians like to spend 
but not to save; short-term investments are often misplaced (remind, e.g. bridges without 
connections in Japan); and good investments take time.   
So, the best thing that governments can do is to bind themselves to the mast of the ship 
like Ulysses against the Sirens in Greek mythology. In other words: to resist tempting but 
dangerous policies and to build instead automatic stabilizers into the system: For instance, 
unemployment insurance which maintains effective demand during the crisis; short-time 
work allowance which prevents any unemployment through risk sharing among workers, 
                                                 
3
 For example: Estonia (+20.7), Ireland (+18.4), Latvia (+23.2), Lithuania (+26.1) and Spain (+21.6) from 
the beginning of 2008 to the third quarter of 2010. 
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employers and the state during a crisis; health insurance for all independent of having or 
not having a job; reliable basic pensions independent from the individual work-life career 
which is often determined by pure luck. All these automatic stabilizers maintain not only 
consumers’ demand in crisis but also their trust in the economic recovery. Research in 
Europe shows countries with such automatic stabilizers have performed best and have 
kept youth unemployment within reasonable limits (Dolls et al. 2011). 
The second thing that governments can do is to support sustainable competitiveness 
through setting the right framework conditions for innovative private investment, e.g. 
through effective control of financial markets and the deregulation of product market 
monopolies. Some targeted industrial policy also helps to create new jobs, e.g. by 
fostering green technologies as well as information and communication technologies. 
Since both industrial areas are globally interdependent, some international coordination of 
growth strategies is necessary. This holds especially true for the still nationally fragmented 
Eurozone.4 One example of what happens if governments are not investing enough in 
competitive technologies can be observed in some European countries like Spain and 
Greece, where youth unemployment now exceeds (conventionally measured) 50 percent. 
France has also lost its competitiveness, which is reflected, for instance, in the drastic 
decline of jobs in manufacturing. In 2000, France still had 20 percent of jobs in 
manufacturing; in 2011 only 12.5 percent; in Germany, the share of manufacturing jobs 
even increased to 26.2 percent during this time. 
An important framework condition in Germany has been wage moderation through a 
cooperative partnership among trade unions and employers associations – a partnership 
protected and supported by the government. Other framework conditions are a broadly 
skilled, middle-level workforce of craftsmen and engineers maintained through an 
extensive apprenticeship system, and an active industrial policy by governments at the 
regional level supporting, in particular, the German “Mittelstand”, which means small- 
and medium-sized companies.   
                                                 
4
 For the need of creating an “adequate fiscal capacity” in the Eurozone (see Alberto Majocchi 2013).  
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Of course, the decline of manufacturing can be compensated to some extent through 
intelligent services. But these cannot be restricted to luxury articles like the French brand 
names Louis Vuitton, Hermès and Yves Saint-Laurent. A competitive service industry 
must be related to mass markets like financial or insurance services, information and 
communication technologies, and education or health services. South Korea’s 
manufacturing also declined dramatically; it seems that Korea’s youth unemployment is 
somehow related to this decline and to the lack of exportable high-quality services. In this 
respect, governments can play an important role in creating jobs related to public goods 
like education, health, child and elderly care. Korea’s economy is strong, but its job 
creation dynamic is low in high-quality services, reflected, for instance, in low 
employment rates for women compared to the US and Germany (Figure 4A, Appendix). 
The third thing that governments can do is allocate resources for special youth measures in 
the framework of activating labour market policy in an anticyclical way. European 
research shows that – on average – increasing ALMP expenditure per unemployed worker 
by 1 percentage point of GDP per member of the labour force lowers the overall youth 
NEET risk by 0.15 percentage points (European Foundation 2012). Switzerland (with 
relatively low youth unemployment) is one of the few countries to have established an 
anticyclical expenditure rule for active labour market policy (Duell et al. 2010). 
So, governments can do a lot, not least – and that sounds like a paradox – by strengthening 
market principles, for instance, opening access to markets for small and medium-sized 
enterprises by fighting all kinds of monopolies and ensuring that young people are 
allocated to jobs by their competence and not by their formal educational status. 
1.2 Youth needs the right skills 
New jobs often require new skills (Schmid 2012a). But it is a mistake to think that all 
these new skills require high tertiary education at universities: Time served in formal 
education is not enough; what counts, at the end of the day, is what you can do with what 
you know (Wagner 2012). This becomes all the more true with the internet revolution 
which allows you full access to all the passive knowledge you may need through 
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intelligent search machines like Google or Yahoo within seconds. Furthermore, it is a 
mistake that skills required in the formal education system are sufficient over the whole 
life course. Lifelong learning is more at stake than a further extension of formal schooling, 
in particularly in view of complementarities of learning processes (Heckman 2008). And, 
finally, it is a mistake to believe that all youth enjoy work with abstract symbols possibly 
combined with a lot of red tape and endless meetings. Many prefer practical work and 
work with which they can connect some meaning and which gives them a personal 
identity.  
Youth unemployment is lowest in European countries with dual learning systems that 
connect their education system closer to the labour market. These countries are Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands and Switzerland (Ebner 2012; Figure 1A, 
Appendix). On average, increasing the share of upper secondary students that attend dual 
learning systems by 1 percentage point decreases NEET rates by about 0.04–0.09 
percentage points (European Foundation 2012). 
Dual education systems correspond to the concept of the transitional labour market 
(TLM).5 This concept intends, among other things, to build institutional bridges between 
education and work over the whole life course. Part of the underlying theory is the 
principle of fair risk sharing and the insight that human capital and social capital are not 
only built in schools but also on the job. The flipside of this insight is that the longer 
people remain jobless the more their acquired human and social capital deteriorates. So, 
everything has to be done to avoid or to reduce unemployment not only for youth but also 
for adults, including mature age workers.  
Establishing TLMs for youth has five advantages: they combine learning and working (1), 
learning and earning (2), learning and identity building (3); they also give voice to 
employers and workers in determining the content of learning (4); and they build trust on 
both sides of the labour market: through the standardisation of training contents, workers 
                                                 
5
 To the concept of TLM see – among others – Schmid and Gazier (2002), Schmid (2008), Schmid (2011), 
Muffels (2008), and Rogowski (2008).    
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can trust that their skills are valued on the market, and employers can rely on the 
competences of graduates entering the labour market. 
1.3 Youth needs the right governance 
“Governance” means not just the state, but the effective and efficient cooperation of 
private, semi-private and public actors. Of crucial importance is the coordination of 
educational measures, labour market and social policies. For example, even in Sweden, 
which is in many respects a model country (high welfare and high productivity), youth 
unemployment is high because the responsibility between school, labour exchange and 
social service is divided, and because there are strict demarcations between standard 
education and youth measures, and because there is an overdue emphasis on academically 
oriented upper secondary school education (Olofsson and Wadensjö 2012). In Austria, 
Denmark, Switzerland and (partly) in Germany or the Netherlands (with low youth 
unemployment) you find closer cooperation and coordination between education and 
work. 
Another important requisite for good governance are cooperative industrial relations 
systems. Well-functioning corporate systems are between a free market and the state! Here 
market means the autonomous determination of wages or working conditions by 
employers’ and workers’ representatives. However, the state has to play a strong role, too, 
by acknowledging and protecting the resulting collective agreements and by setting 
minimum standards below which the market is not allowed to work.  
Given this institutional framework, corporate governance plays an important role in 
taming youth unemployment. European research shows that employment systems with 
cooperative industrial relations systems have lower unemployment and in particular lower 
youth unemployment. Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (all with low or 
moderate youth unemployment) are examples of cooperative industrial relations; whereas 
France, Greece, Italy, and Spain (all with high youth unemployment) have hostile 
industrial relations. Good cooperation between unions, employers and the state reduces 
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NEET rates. Specifically, increasing the level of wage coordination by 1 point on the scale 
reduces NEET rates by about 0.75–0.96 percentage points (European Foundation 2012). 
2. Immediate Measures against Youth Unemployment 
Most of the suggestions developed above need time for implementation because they refer 
to structural reforms. They will not provide immediate solutions for many youth currently 
without a decent job or in further education. But something must be done quickly: 
Research on youth unemployment for both Europe and the United States show 
consistently significant scarring effects of early unemployment in later life: Even after 30 
years wages and happiness are lower than for young people who had a smooth transition 
from school to work (Bell and Blanchflower 2011).  
In the European context, the European Parliament and the European Commission have 
proposed a European Youth Guarantee, which is intended to give every young person 
under the age of 25 the right to a job, an apprenticeship, further training or a job combined 
with training if they have been out of work for four months. Of course, this is more easily 
suggested than done, and there is no one-size-fits-all concept. From European experiences, 
five strategies are suggested: (1) prevent early school leaving; (2) reintegrate early school 
leavers; (3) facilitate transition from school to work; (4) foster employability; (5) remove 
barriers and provide incentives to employers. For each strategy, I proffer one example to 
provide a gist of what can be done.6  
(1)  Dropping out from schools is the most dangerous pathway for the young and one of 
the most important drivers for repeated unemployment or long-term unemployment. The 
reasons for leaving school early are manifold; one important cause is lack of motivation, 
another is cognitive difficulties. Some countries in Europe (e.g. Luxembourg, Germany) 
have experimented with alternative learning environments for 6 to 12 weeks, called 
                                                 
6
 For an extensive review of measures taken up and recommended see European Foundation (2012). 
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“mosaic classes” in which young scholars at risk of dropping-out are given various 
personalised help to return successfully to their class.7 
(2)  For young people who have already dropped out early, second-chance opportunities 
may help, for instance, special preparatory schools (e.g. Belgium, Germany) that provide 
skills outside the conventional schedule yet validate these skills so that they can be 
recognised by potential employers. 
(3)  One quick way to facilitate school-to-work-transitions is to identify already existing 
skill deficits on the market and to subsidise youth jobs in these areas. For example, in the 
Netherlands, the XXL Jobs Initiative offers young people jobs in sectors where the 
retirement of older workers will lead to a shortage of skills and knowledge. It is intended 
that the older employees will transfer their skills to the young people and that the young 
people will receive strong guidance in their transition to the labour market. 
(4)  Often, formal skills are available and sufficient but work experience is missing. One 
way to fill this gap is to establish accredited training companies providing such 
experiences. In Austria, young people who cannot find suitable apprenticeship places in a 
company after leaving compulsory school can get a ‘supra-company apprenticeship 
training’, which offers practical training in apprenticeship workshops in specialised 
facilities – for example in hotels, restaurants, and private or public canteens. 
(5)  One of the most important barriers for employers when hiring young people is the 
lack of work experience which leaves a gap between wages and expected productivity. 
Apart from apprenticeships that already reduce youth entry wages, one way to remove this 
barrier is to bridge this gap through temporary wage-cost subsidies or temporary 
exemption from social taxes for employers recruiting additional (young) jobless workers. 
In addition, many young jobless people could become entrepreneurs should business start-
ups be made easier by reducing red-tape, counselling and capitalising unemployment 
                                                 
7
 Related in particular to non-cognitive skills (like motivation, endurance, self-control, curiosity), even 
earlier interventions directed to disadvantaged children are required (Heckman 2008).  
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benefits or providing temporary tax credits. Both, recruitment subsidies as well as start-up 
subsidies have proven quite successful in German evaluation studies.8 
3. Comparing experiences from Europe and the United States 
Comparing Europe and the US, one thing quickly becomes evident: Before the last 
recession, European unemployment figures had always been higher and recovery from 
recessions in Europe was always slower than in the USA (Figure 2A, Appendix). But, as 
already mentioned, the differences in Europe are large (Figure 1A, Appendix). Some 
countries, for instance, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands, had and have consistently 
lower unemployment rates than the USA although their welfare policies are much more 
generous and universal, which means not targeted only to the poor or disadvantaged, but 
targeted to all people. So, labour welfare policies as such cannot be the main reason for 
bad employment performance, all the more that the US performed badly in terms of 
employment during the last recession: For the EU as a whole, the fall of 1.3 percent in 
employment during the recession comprised a 2.5 percent reduction in full-time jobs and a 
4.2 percent increase in part-time jobs. In the US, the response was even starker, with full-
time jobs falling by 7.9 percent while part-time-work increased by 10.1 percent (Bell and 
Blanchflower 2011). 
The main difference between the EU and the USA certainly relates to labour market 
regulation and social policy: It is easier for American employers to hire and fire than in 
most European countries; it is easier for employers to change wages according to market 
conditions; and the average American worker is more mobile than the average European 
worker. All this plus an excellent higher education system and a steady stream of highly 
qualified immigrants makes the US the richest OECD country measured in terms of GDP 
per capita. But there are serious side effects. 
For the average American worker, the dominance of free market principles means not only 
high wage inequality but also much less social security than for the average European 
                                                 
8
 For an overview of German evaluation studies see Heyer et al. (2012); specifically for start-up subsidies 
see Caliendo and Künn (2010). 
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worker, in particular in the case of unemployment. Income inequality is one of the highest 
among OECD countries. The American economist Emmanuel Saez, for instance, 
calculated that the richest 1 percent of the population increased their income by 11.2 
percent from 2009 to 2011, whereas the other 99 percent lost 0.4 percent. In the period 
from 1993 to 2011, the average real income of the top 1 percent increased by 57.5 percent, 
and only 5.8 percent for the ‘bottom’ 99 percent (Saez 2013). These figures no longer 
correspond to “justice as fairness” conceptualised by the American social philosopher 
John Rawls who said that inequalities are only justified as long as they raise the lot of the 
most disadvantaged people (Rawls 1971). Furthermore, this inequality corresponds with 
one of the highest figures related to the index of health and social problems, which 
includes: level of trust, mental illness or drug and alcohol addiction, life expectancy and 
infant mortality, obesity, children’s educational performance, teenage birth, homicides, 
imprisonment rates, and social mobility (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). 
To some extent American youth unemployment resembles that of Korea because many 
formally high-skilled youth are jobless or are in jobs below their educational level. Having 
a higher education but a low-paid job is not only depressing for the individuals concerned 
but is also an economic waste for the society. Finally, the average American worker also 
enjoys only about nine days of paid vacation compared to around 25 days of an average 
European worker (Schmid 2012b). 
During the last decade, some European countries have shown that it is possible to establish 
flexible labour markets without neglecting social security and fair income policy. This 
concept is known as ‘flexicurity’ closely related to the theory of TLM: workers who have 
to change jobs over a transition period of unemployment get high benefits for a restricted 
yet still longer period than in the USA; support through active labour market measures, 
e.g. training or subsidised employment, is also much higher. Austria, Denmark and the 
Netherlands are flexicurity-model countries, and after the labour market reforms according 
to ‘Agenda 2010’, Germany comes close to this model. Germany’s labour welfare 
policies, however, are much more directed towards the internal flexibility of companies, 
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for instance, fair risk sharing through short-time work allowances, working time accounts 
or wage flexibility through collectively bargained wage corridors. 
But one should not dismiss the fact that even the USA disposes of labour market 
institutions beyond the free market principle. Let me briefly mention the American 
unemployment insurance system introduced by Roosevelt in 1935. Sure, this system is less 
generous than, for instance, in Germany or Denmark (which, by the way, reformed their 
systems towards more active labour market policy). But a recent paper by the CBO 
(Congressional Budget Office), consistent with recent European research, rated the US 
unemployment insurance system as the best of 11 possible countercyclical measures 
because of its timeliness, strength, and temporary nature. Besides replacing lost earnings 
to households, the UI job creation strength is estimated to be between two to five times 
that of infrastructure spending (O’Leary 2013). 
So, even considering the US experiences, Korea might well be advised to enhance and not 
to curtail its employment insurance system by expanding in particular the coverage from a 
minority to the majority of workers and to spend as much as possible on investive 
measures such as ‘learning and working’ for youth and active labour market policy for the 
adults. 
4. Lessons to be learned from Europe – with special reference to Germany 
Generally, in these times policy learning might be out of sight due to difficulties of 
mobilising sufficient resources. However, the current fiscal and economic crisis is not a 
crisis of resources but a crisis of inequality and speculative use of our (always) scarce 
resources through some irresponsible banks and a lack of control in global financial 
markets. The real problem is that too few of these resources are channelled into real 
investments. We have an investment crisis, including a lack of expenditure into the 
education of our young generation and active labour market policies which – if properly 
implemented – are investments and not costly consumption expenditure. 
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One also has to be aware of the tremendous cost of youth unemployment. In Europe, this 
cost was estimated to be €153 billion in 2011, corresponding to more than 1.2 percent of 
GDP. Of course, this cost varies a great deal between Member States (from less than 0.4% 
to more than 3%), and Europe will not be able to save the entire cost of €153 billion. 
However, using the unit cost of each person in NEET, the analysis shows that if enough 
vacancies were created in Europe to reintegrate 10 percent of NEETs into the labour 
market, this would provide a saving of more than €15 billion per year. If 20 percent of 
NEETs could be reintegrated, the saving would rise to €30 billion (European Foundation 
2012).  
So, what is needed is political leadership to tell people this truth and to act accordingly. 
And it is not only the economic costs of youth unemployment that belongs to this truth. 
The social costs, both for individuals and the society, are also tremendous: long-term 
scarring effects in terms of wages and employment status, higher criminal records, 
deterioration of health, lower political engagement, decreasing social participation and – 
last but not least, as Robert Putnam expressed it – an erosion of ‘thick trust’ (friendships 
and neighbourhoods) and above all an erosion of ‘thin trust’, which means generalized 
social trust emphasizing empathy, shared interests, a sense of the common good, mutual 
respect and obligation among people (Putnam 2000: 142). 
Reading the documents, it seems clear that Korea has a problem with ‘academic inflation’ 
or over-education (e.g., OECD 2012: 73-4). Over 50 percent of university graduates do 
not get a job within the first year or only jobs much below their formal education level. 
Although many eventually get a job roughly equivalent with their education, such a 
system creates a lot of waste not only in terms of sunk-investment costs but also in terms 
of inequality and injustice. Getting a job mainly by formal credentials and not by 
competences creates wrong economic incentives and discriminates against those young 
people coming from low-income households. 9  
                                                 
9
 Korea currently has nearly 100 thousand hagwons, private education institutions mainly intended for 
tutoring children to prepare for schools and universities and to enhance their competitive advantage. The 
concentration of around 6,000 hagwons in the Kangnam district of Seoul is thought to be an important factor 
in the high housing prices in that area, which has become a major social issue. The hagwons have more 
teachers than the public school system and attract the best ones with higher salaries; the amount of outlays 
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The concept of transitional labour market (TLM) might teach here something. It builds, 
among others, on the concept of learning by monitoring and on the theory of fair risk 
sharing.10 Related to youth unemployment, as already mentioned, it is the idea of building 
institutional bridges between the formal education system and the labour market. The 
German apprenticeship system is a paradigmatic example for this idea. About two-thirds 
of young Germans enter the vocational track around age 16. Roughly 50 percent of them 
conclude a two to three-and-a-half year contract with an employer, learning one of about 
350 licensed occupations on the job. At the same time, they attend a vocational school 
where they acquire general knowledge. So, in the ideal case, this system provides both: 
market-oriented skills with a realistic job perspective and general skills needed to adapt to 
structural changes in the economy or to unexpected changes during one’s personal life 
course. Another 20 percent in the vocational track enter a full-time vocational school in 
Germany, whereas around 30 percent remain in the so-called transitional system preparing 
for a better education or employment; three-quarters of them having lower or even no 
accredited education. 
Certainly, this system also has flaws in reality, in particular the danger of over-
specialisation on the one hand and the exclusion of disadvantaged and vulnerable youth on 
the other.11 But overall, the advantages prevail: On the one hand, such institutional 
bridges reduce information deficits or information asymmetries through standardised and 
accredited occupations or trades;12 and they provide, on the other hand, work experience 
that also helps to build up confidence among young people, especially those with more 
practical than theoretical talents. Countries like France, Spain or Italy face high youth 
                                                                                                                                                   
per student in private tutoring is four times higher for the middle-income group than those in the lowest 
income group. For households with income over 6 million won per month, enrolment rates rise to nearly 
90%, while outlays per month reach around 450 thousand won (around $400). So, a student with a better 
socioeconomic background is more likely to enter a prestigious university and study a subject that he or she 
would like to. One study found that 16.9% of students from the upper middle income class attended upper 
level universities compared to only 5.8% for lower-class students. In the meantime, Seoul introduced a 10 
p.m. curfew for hagwons to control excessive use of this system (OECD 2012: 68, 131-5). 
10
 See in particular Schmid 2008: 213–241; Schmid 2011: 39–112. 
11
 For a much deeper and rich analysis of dual education and learning systems in Germany and in 
international comparison see – among others – Biavaschi et al. 2012, Brzinsky-Fay 2011, Ebner 2012, 
Eichhorst et al. 2012, and Solga 2008. 
12
 Korea still has thousands of private-sector qualifications established by companies and training institutes 
(OECD 2012: 76). 
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unemployment even in boom periods because their educational system concentrates on 
high formal or academic qualifications. These countries clearly lack skills and 
competences at the middle level that are more market-oriented and allow a smooth 
transition from school to work. 
Korea has obviously already reacted by introducing, for instance, 28 “Meisterschulen” 
according to the model of German-speaking countries. This type of TLM could be 
extended, in particular at the college and the university level. In Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland business colleges, vocational academies and industrial or applied universities 
play an increasing role, and the graduates of these schools often have much better labour 
market chances than graduates from pure academic universities. Austria and Switzerland, 
and to some extent Denmark might even be better models for Korea because they do not 
specialise too much as Germany is currently doing. In Austria, already 26 percent of youth 
aged around 16 attend full-time vocational colleges with integrated practical experiences 
in firms (‘Berufliche Höhere Schulen’ ) providing both: a licence for exercising a broadly 
defined occupation as well as the right to enter the university (‘Matura’). In Switzerland, 
one-third of youth attend business colleges or universities for applied science 
(‘Fachhochschulen’) that also require practical experiences from both the teachers as well 
as the students. Both countries have better records in integrating youth into the labour 
market at their acquired skills, and both countries also do better for disadvantaged youth 
by ensuring some kind of accredited education that is marketable. 
Investing in dual education systems is also an effective device for sharing investment risks 
between employers, workers and the state in a fair way. The Korean government might 
therefore consider co-financing more in dual education systems. Currently, its share of 
public expenditure in education is the lowest in OECD countries, but its youth 
unemployment measured in NEET is one of the highest (Figure 5A, Appendix).13 
It is often argued, in particular in the US, that getting rid of minimum wages for youth 
would solve the problem. At lower wages, employers would be willing to hire more young 
                                                 
13
 Strengthening vocational education and career guidance would also reduce the excessive costs for private 
tutoring (OECD 2012: 136); see also footnote 9. 
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people. But European experiences show that minimum wages play, if at all, a minor role. 
One also has to consider the discouraging effects of very low wages for young people, 
especially for young adults who want to establish a family. Decent wages also ensure that 
employers not only attract skilled young people but that these people remain loyal, work 
hard and do not opportunistically switch to the next job paying a little more. Labour 
turnover may be efficient, but a too high fluctuation is a waste of resources and kills 
mutual investments and respective trust between employers and workers. 
Some, not all, European experiences show that there are better functional equivalents for 
just lowering wages. First, high formal education raises the reservation wages of young 
people that might not correspond to the market realities. The TLM-system of learning and 
earning, however, mitigates this problem by paying only for the productive part of work 
and not for learning on the job. So, there is risk sharing between employers and workers. 
Furthermore, in this way young people become acquainted to the market pay structure and 
do not develop unrealistic high reservation wages. Second and after the apprenticeship, 
systems of wage coordination take into account the lower productivity of young people by 
establishing relatively low entry levels of wages for the youth but providing at the same 
time some security of career perspective with respective increases of wages after 
considerable work experience. 
So, markets are necessary but are not sufficient for solving youth unemployment. The 
concept of TLM tries to combine both, the market and the state. It brings a market 
orientation into the formal education system for the young by learning on the job and 
earning at market wages, and it brings the state into the market by ensuring decent 
minimum wages, quality standards and the public financing of schools and teachers. 
A flourishing ‘Mittelstand’, as it is called in Germany, with thriving small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME), is an essential condition for utilising as well as for establishing a 
healthy middle-level skill reservoir. Such an entrepreneurial infrastructure, however, 
cannot be established from one day to the next. The three most important strategies would 
be: an industrial policy supporting SME; regulatory policy restricting casual and informal 
jobs with wages and work conditions below decent standards; an education policy 
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providing skilled workers at the middle level, e.g. craft workers, engineers, and 
professional care and health workers. 
As regards the third strategy, Korea should not give up its well-established tertiary 
education system which, in international comparison, is clearly an asset. But this system 
might be improved by more market orientation through establishing principles of dual 
education and learning. Apart from the already mentioned dual business high schools or 
universities of applied sciences in the German speaking countries, a possible model might 
also be the recently founded Baden-Wuerttemberg Cooperative State University with its 
main seat in Stuttgart, eight other locations in the region and four branch campuses. This 
university integrates academic studies and work experience. The students have an 
employment contract and through the entire period, they receive a monthly salary and 
have the insurance of being an employee. Small classes of at most 30 students guarantee 
close supervision. The university cooperates with numerous universities and enterprises 
worldwide. That makes it possible for most of the degree programmes (business, 
engineering, and social work) to include a training and education period abroad thereby 
responding to the increasing demand for internationalisation. The students’ future 
prospects are excellent: roughly 90 percent of the students sign regular employment 
contracts with the companies after graduation (www.dhbw.de).  
So, governments can play an important role in establishing and extending TLMs, which 
means dual systems of earning and learning: First by extending conditional public 
support, for instance, support conditional on market as well as on social performance 
indicators, on work-place training, and on including employers or community 
representatives in the boards of colleges and industrial universities. Sweden, for instance, 
has even written into its constitution the obligation of colleges and universities to make a 
contribution to regional economic development. Furthermore, vocational academies, 
industrial colleges or applied universities have to provide to an increasing extent education 
and training for foreign students. So, education might develop into a job-creation 
machinery for teachers and trainers, something that might be an objective for Korean 
education (and industrial) policy because the internationalisation of the Korean university 
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system does not yet seem to be well-developed, according to the recent OECD Economic 
Survey for Korea. 
Outlook 
What are the future prospects for youth unemployment? The Danish Nobel prize winner 
Nils Bohr once said: “It is hard to predict, especially the future.” Too much depends on 
too many single decisions. However, at least one thing seems to be sure, because the 
decisions have already been made: Demography or birth rates. Progressively shrinking 
cohorts – in particular in Korea and in Germany – will have dramatic effects on the 
number of entrants to the future labour market over the next 15 years or so. In this respect, 
the decline is relatively small in the US compared with other countries, in part because of 
its relatively high rate of immigration, and immigrants tend to be young. But by 2020 for 
instance, the number of 20-year-olds will have dropped by 12 percent in the Euro area, 
and Korea is facing the fastest population ageing in the OECD. So, youth unemployment 
in Europe – and probably in Korea as well – might be less of a problem in 10 years than 
the lack of skilled people due to demographic reasons. 
But this is no reason to be reassured. Much depends on creating the right skills. And here I 
come back to the ‘academic inflation’ of skills, which can be observed more or less in all 
countries, not least – unfortunately – in the poor developing countries. What are the 
reasons for this inflation? I believe that one important reason is the parents’ aspiration to 
get their children the best education they can imagine. I read, for instance, from a survey 
in Korea that 93 percent of parents want their (usually only one) child to get an education 
at one of the best universities. This, obviously, cannot work for all. Individually, it may be 
rational; but collectively it is non-rational – creating congestion, disappointment or even 
desperation.  
What is the reason behind this aspiration? I believe that this aspiration is – among other 
obvious motives like cultural thrive – strongly driven by an insurance motive. High formal 
education is still the best insurance device to end up in a high-paid job with high social 
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security. So, and this may sound like a provocation for many Koreans, one solution for 
this problem of ‘academic inflation’ and respective high youth unemployment would be to 
moderate these aspirations by establishing better social security for all, especially for the 
many of those who still are not or are not sufficiently covered by health, employment and 
pension insurance. If such a safety net existed, many more young people would probably 
be happy to aspire and to take the risk of jobs at the lower or middle end of the labour 
market – provided that wages and work conditions are decent and that the doors remain 
open when they plan to receive higher education and better jobs later during their life 
course. 
From this point of view – and considering the developing countries, in particular Africa – 
the global problem of youth unemployment will probably be more dramatic for the next 
five or 10 years than today. Confronted with this challenge, the wise words of the French 
writer Antoine de Saint-Exupery should be remembered: “As for the future, your task is 
not to foresee it, but to enable it.” 
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Appendix 
Figure 1A: Youth unemployment rates in Europe 2011 according to the conventional 
measure: Unemployed youth in age15-24 as percent of ‘active’ youth labour 
force in age 15-24 
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Figure 2A:  Youth unemployment rates in Korea, United States, EU-21 and Germany, 
2003–2011 
 
 
Figure 3A:  Youth unemployment rates in Korea, United States, EU-21 and Germany, 
2003–2011; measured by unemployed youth in age 15-24 as a percentage of 
total youth population in age 15-24 
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Figure 4A:  Employment rates of women in Korea, United States, EU-21 and Germany, 
2003–2011 
 
Source: OECD stats 
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Figure 5A: Youth unemployment measured by NEET, 2010 (age group 15–29) and 
share of public spending on overall expenditures on educational institutions, 
2009 
 
Note: Japan: age group 15–24, Source: OECD Education at a Glance Highlights 2012, p. 23, Figure 1.11; p. 
51, Figure 3.10 
 
